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Abstract: 
This paper deals with an analysis of the discursive accounts of Eastern Cape white 
commercial farmers on the subject of Democracy. Drawing on the theoretical 
perspectives of Social Constructionism and Discourse Analysis – which view 
individuals’ accounts of their realities as produced and informed by their particular 
social and historical context – the paper seeks to provide an analysis of the content of, 
and rhetorical strategies within the participants’ accounts and explanations. Such 
accounts of the social, historical and political circumstances in which Eastern Cape 
commercial farmers find themselves are thought to provide valuable insights into the 
manner in which the process of democratisation has been received by members of the 
agricultural sector. Data collection was conducted via brief, audio taped, semi-
structured interviews. The participants were all white men and women, living in a 
commercial farming region of the Eastern Cape Province. Responses to the interviews 
were subjected to the Discourse Analytical procedure advanced by Ian Parker. 
Analyses reveal that participants are critical of the notion of democracy; utilize 
specific rhetorical and argumentation strategies; make use of notions and techniques 
of ‘Othering’; and subscribe to a colonial / patriarchal ideology which attempts to 
idealize pre-democratic South Africa. These findings illustrate what is in many ways 
still an ongoing political and ideological struggle in the rural regions of the country. 
 
 2
Table of Contents:
1. Introduction and Context of the Research             p. 5 
1.1) Different views on ‘Democracy’            p. 6 
1.2) Political Culture and Social Psychology           p. 8 
1.3) Ideological ways of Talk – Liberalism and Racism          p. 11 
1.4) The Current Context              p. 18 
2. Research Methodology               p. 21 
2.1)      Ontological and Epistemological considerations          p. 21 
2.2) Research Questions              p. 22 
2.3) Recruitment of Participants             p. 22 
2.4) Data Collection – Semi-structured interviews          p. 23 
2.5) Data Analysis – Discourse Analysis            p. 23 
3. Analysis and Discussion of the Findings             p. 30 
3.1)    Democracy: ‘It’s a hell of a bugger-up’            p. 30 
 3.1.1)      Liberalism, Rights and freedoms           p. 31 
3.1.2) Democracy as ‘apartheid in reverse’          p. 33 
3.1.3) Things are worse for farmers           p. 36 
3.1.4) The old days were better            p. 41 
3.1.5) Things are worse for the people, too          p. 43 
3.2)    Democracy: ‘It should have happened a hundred years ago’    p. 45 
3.2.1) Democracy is about rights and freedoms          p. 45  
3.2.2) Dysfunctional democracy            p. 48 
3.2.3) ‘They’ just need to adjust            p. 49 
3.2.4) The future looks bright             p. 50 
4. Concluding Comments               p. 52 
4.1) Review of the findings             p. 52 
4.2) Suggestions for further research            p. 54 
4.3) Concerns regarding the validity of the research          p. 54 
5. Reference List                p. 57 
 
 
 3
  
 
 
The author would like to acknowledge the following persons for their input and 
support (both academically and otherwise) whilst I was writing this thesis: 
 
 
My supervisor: Mr. Desmond Painter 
 
My Colleagues: Mr. David Neves, Ms. Henriette van Zyl 
 
My family 
 
and, finally, 
 
The Research Participants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4
Chapter 1: Introduction and context of the research 
 
With the first decade of democracy in South Africa behind us, the time is ripe to begin 
serious and critical evaluations of the extent of the social changes that South Africa 
has undergone.  Such an endeavour should not only focus on the macro-level of 
political, historical and economic change, but also needs to pay attention to the micro-
level of individuals’ perceptions, attitudes and actions.  The research conducted for 
this thesis is one of a multitude of possible attempts to do just that. This thesis 
describes the results of a discourse analytical study conducted with white commercial 
farmers in the Eastern Cape province. The study aimed to elicit the farmers’ 
conceptions of, and relationship to, the democratic social transformation that has 
occurred since 1994.  
 
Before embarking upon any sort of discussion of how the participants in this study 
constructed their accounts of democracy and democratic change, it is necessary to 
provide a discussion of several key theoretical concepts and the links between them. 
This is to be done in order to better illustrate the logic underlying the analysis of the 
discursive practices employed by Eastern Cape white commercial farmers. To this 
end, the discussion following in this chapter focuses on attempting to provide both a 
definition and discussion of the concept ‘democracy’.  The aim is to illustrate the 
manner in which this idea can be variously constructed, with differing emphases and 
connotations. Following this, some attention is devoted to the idea of ‘political 
culture’ and a discussion of social attitudes and perceptions of particular sectors of the 
population is offered in order to provide further description of the broader socio-
political context in which the participants in this study position themselves. Finally, 
the chapter draws to a close with an exploration of the ideological dimensions 
underlying certain kinds of construction of the concepts ‘democracy’, by providing a 
discursive examination of both ‘liberalism’ and ‘racism’, as well as providing a brief 
discussion of the current context in which this research has taken place.  
 
Chapter two focuses on the methodology employed by this research and engages in a 
discussion of the social constructionist paradigm in which this research is located. An 
explanation of discourse analysis as a method of qualitative data analysis is also 
offered. Chapter three provides a detailed discourse analysis and discussion of the 
 5
gathered interview texts, showing the particular ideologically informed patterns of 
talk that participants in the research used to construct their accounts of democracy in 
South Africa. Finally, chapter four attempts to provide a brief summative discussion 
by way of conclusion and suggests some recommendations for further research.     
 
1.1) Different views on ‘Democracy’  
Defining democracy as a political system is not easy. The same holds for attempting 
to investigate people’s attitudes towards the process of democratic change that has 
been ongoing in South Africa for the past decade.  Arblaster (1994, p. 3) writes 
“democracy is a concept before it is a fact, and because it is a concept it has no single 
precise and agreed meaning.”  One is therefore tempted to apply a commonsense 
approach to arriving at a definition of this concept, and this is indeed one of the 
features of the research conducted for this thesis – an investigation of the ways of 
speaking employed by representatives of a certain sector of society in the construction 
of their attitudes towards democracy. Speaking of commonsense notions of 
democracy, Arblaster (1994) argues that people commonly assume that the concept 
signifies government by the people or their elected representatives.  This seems at 
least to fit at face value.  However, when paying closer attention to the details of 
exactly how ‘democratic’ systems of government function it appears that “democracy 
is a term which, whatever its precise meaning, will always signify for many a 
cherished political principle or ideal, and for that reason alone it is never likely to 
achieve a single agreed meaning” (Arblaster, 1994, p. 6).  
 
More formal attempts at definition of the concept do of course exist.  For instance, 
Reynolds (1999, p. 20) cites Martin Lipset’s procedural and mechanistic features of 
democracy as being important elements of a definition: 
 
First, competition exists for government positions, and fair elections for public office 
occur at regular intervals without the use of force and without excluding any social 
group. Second, citizens participate in selecting their leaders and forming policies. And, 
third, civil and political liberties exist to ensure the integrity of political competition and 
participation.    
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Naturally, such a definition assumes the widespread popular support and consent for 
the system of government (Arblaster, 1994), as well as the adoption (and in most 
cases, constitutional protection) of certain liberal attitudes regarding individual rights 
and liberties. This does not mean that democracy and liberal ideology necessarily go 
hand in hand (and it is certainly possible to argue that they do not), but there are some 
domains of overlap. However, an in-depth discussion of the theory of democracy is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
Defining democracy purely substantively in terms of the procedures and mechanisms 
by which it functions as a political system may lose sight of these popular attitudes. 
Similarly to Arblaster (1994), Mattes and Calland (2002, p. 4) argue, “Democracy is a 
principle rather than a set of procedures.” Given this view, they go on to argue that 
examining democracy in South Africa should not focus on the institutional or 
procedural form it takes, but rather should revolve around the extent to which the 
principle is realised (Mattes & Calland, 2002). This involves investigating the extent 
to which popular self-government has been achieved as well as examining the 
discursive sets of ideas and attitudes that constitute the notion itself.  
 
Research concerning democratisation in Southern Africa has tended to focus on either 
institutional / macropolitical changes (Deegan, 1999; Reynolds, 1999), or on a 
quantitative audit of popular perceptions of democracy and democratic change 
(Graham & Coetzee, 2002).  In the case of the former, attention has been paid to 
observing institutional indicators of democratic change, in order to establish the 
workings of newly founded democracies. A number of variables have been examined 
to determine the strength and direction of political change on a macro level. These 
include political stability and/or violence, electoral indicators (such as voter turnout), 
as well as various economic indicators such as growth and inflation rates (Reynolds, 
1999).  Other studies have tracked constitutional development and the impact of 
governmental reform policies to determine the state of democracy within South 
Africa (Deegan, 1999). 
 
Regarding popular perceptions of democracy, IDASA has recently conducted a 
Democracy Index survey in South Africa (Graham & Coetzee, 2002). The purpose of 
this audit/survey was to assess popular evaluations of South Africa’s democracy 
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along five dimensions: 1) Consensus on and participation in popular self-government; 
2) popular selection of decision-makers; 3) popular control over decision-makers; 4) 
protection of citizens’ equality and their ability to control representatives; and 5) 
economic and social inequality (Mattes & Calland, 2002).  
 
The research conducted for this thesis however, adopted a more qualitative approach 
to the investigation of the extent to which popular social attitudes and ideas reflect, 
complement or contradict the abovementioned notion of democracy as a principle. As 
such, it did not focus on an objective assessment of the achievement of ‘popular self-
government’.  Instead it aimed to examine the manner in which representatives of a 
certain sector of South African society construct this notion, as well as their 
subjective experience of political transformation as articulated in and through 
particular discursive patterns.   
 
As such, the notion of democracy is utilised as a rhetorical lens through which to 
focus participants’ discussions concerning their perceptions of post-1994 South 
Africa.  In this way it is anticipated that the use of ‘democracy’ as a metaphor to 
describe the overall political culture will serve to highlight the possible tensions that 
may exist between substantive understandings of democracy and ascription to liberal 
ideology, as well as the manners in which the participants in the research attempt to 
account for such conflicts. 
 
1.2) Political Culture and Social Psychology 
Naturally, any discussion of popular or commonsense constructions of perceptions of, 
or attitudes toward, a political dispensation must include a discussion of the notion of 
‘political culture’.  Bluhm (1974) writes that the idea of political culture is directly 
related to the notion of ideology, which has, in modern times, come to designate “a 
system of political ideas” (Bluhm, 1974, p. 3) often expressed or used to further some 
end or set of values. To elaborate, Bluhm (1974, p. 4) writes, “They [ideologies] 
present total schemes of social, political, and economic values – a complete theory of 
the good life for man in society.”  To this end ideology not only informs our value 
judgements regarding ways in which we should act, but also serves to explain and 
justify (or in the case of revolutionary / radical ideology, to critique) the status quo 
socio-political arrangements within society (Bluhm, 1974). 
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Returning to the notion of political culture, it can be described as the manners in 
which ideology finds expression in the articulations of members of a society 
concerning perceptions of, attitudes toward and value judgements of the particular 
system of government incumbent at any given time.  Bluhm (1974, p. 6) cites Samuel 
Beer as arguing, “Certain aspects of the general culture of a society are especially 
concerned with how government ought to be conducted and what it should try to do.”  
It thus appears apparent that the concept of ‘political culture’ has several important 
dimensions.  Almond (1989, p. 26) thus defines political culture as “consisting of 
cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations to political phenomena, distributed in 
national populations or in subgroups.” 
 
This conceptualisation of the notion of political culture can be further elaborated upon 
in terms of content, orientations and relations (Almond, 1989).  Regarding the content 
of ‘political culture’ Almond (1989, p. 28) elaborates three subcomponents, namely  
“system culture, process culture, and policy culture,” all of which are germane to the 
research conducted for this thesis.  For instance, Almond (1989, p. 28) writes: 
 
The system culture of a nation would consist of the distributions of attitudes toward the 
national community, the regime, and the authorities … These would include the sense of 
national identity, attitudes towards the legitimacy of the regime and its various 
institutions … The process culture would include attitudes towards the self in politics and 
attitudes toward other political actors. The policy culture would consist of the distribution 
of preferences regarding the outputs and outcomes of politics, the ordering among 
different groupings in the population of such political values as welfare, security, and 
liberty. 
 
The research conducted for this thesis provides a discursive analysis of the manner in 
which these very elements of ‘political culture’ are articulated through Eastern Cape 
white commercial farmers’ talk about democracy and the process of democratic 
change that has taken place in the past ten years.  Almond (1989, p. 12) writes, 
“Social Psychology represents an effort to understand and explain how and why the 
attitudes and behaviour of individuals are conditioned and influenced by the presence 
and impact of other individuals and social groupings.”  In this regard, social 
psychological research has been, and indeed still is an important paradigm for the 
generation of theoretical understanding of the dynamic interplay between individual 
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subjects, their group positioning, affiliations, value and belief systems, and their 
orientations towards various elements of the broader societal context.    
 
As such, this thesis is very much about the ways in which representatives of a certain 
subgroup within South African society construct their socio-political identities in 
relation to the notion of democracy. It is thus important to bear in mind a few 
considerations regarding political culture / identity.  The first is that political culture 
should not necessarily be conceived of as a monolithic whole (Bluhm, 1974). This 
point seems to be self-evident, especially if one is to consider the ‘nature’ of such 
social phenomena as ideologies, attitudes, value systems, culture, and even identity.  
At the core of many of these concepts – irrespective of the degree of stability or 
permanence accorded to them – lies the recognition that there is dynamism. Culture 
evolves, values and attitudes change, ideologies compete (Parker, 1992); identity is 
fluid and acquired (Preston, 1997). 
    
Bluhm (1974, p. 11) writes, “A political culture may be a complex entity of 
discontinuous parts, and in a time of change this is usually the case.”  This 
consideration is further supported in the discussion on the methodology employed by 
this research, which explicitly adopts the stance of examining variations, conflicting 
constructions and inconsistencies in order to deconstruct and expose the ideological 
underpinnings of individuals’ modes of speaking.  This conception of the fluid and 
fragmentary nature of culture and identity implies that “any particular expression, any 
discrete identity, will be contested” (Preston, 1997, p. 5).  Such contestedness is 
examined through an exploration of the ways in which subjects articulate ideas 
concerning culture and identity.  A more in-depth discussion of this follows in the 
discussion of the methodology employed by this research.       
 
Related to the above statement, it is argued that studying the manner in which people 
discursively construct their ideas concerning social change in South Africa, as well as 
their perceived membership of particular groups, will reveal whether purportedly 
outmoded ideological beliefs still constitute the bulk of particular patterns of social 
cognition amongst certain sectors of the population, in terms of group categorisations, 
biases and stereotyping (Aronson , Wilson & Akert, 2002).  White commercial 
farmers were proposed as a study population specifically because of the manner in 
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which agrarian life and labour, in the largely rural Eastern Cape province, is located 
at the centre of several intersecting vectors of race, class and historically constituted 
state-supported privilege (Bundy, 1979; Beinart, Delius & Trapido, 1986; Jeeves & 
Crush, 1997).  This makes their particular discourses of democracy of analytic 
interest as a means of monitoring the extent of change in social attitudes and popular 
discourse that is assumed to have taken place since 1994.  
 
1.3) Ideological ways of talk – Liberalism and racism 
In light of what has gone before in this discussion, it is now time to turn attention to 
an exploration of the interaction between the notions of democracy and political 
culture in order to examine more precisely the kinds of ideological assumptions that 
underpin commonsense constructions of these two ideas, as they apply to the 
particular project of this thesis.  
 
As stated above, the notion of democracy implies the adoption of particular values, 
and it has also been argued that definitions of the concept tend to share the common 
feature that they describe a political ideal, as opposed to an actual system of 
government (Arblaster, 1994; Mattes & Calland, 2002).  This dualism between the 
concept of democracy, and the actual political practice of ‘democratic’ societies has 
been commented on by O’Malley (1999). In discussing the results of focus group 
surveys concerning democracy conducted with black South African participants in 
1992, O’Malley (1999) notes that respondents’ ideas about democracy displayed such 
a dualism. O’Malley (1999, p. 123) explains: “Democracy was widely interpreted as 
the antonym for apartheid. It encapsulated the opposite of apartheid … Participants 
did not see democracy as a means, but an end; not as a process, but as a set of goals, 
accomplishments, results.”  
 
As such, democracy was constructed not simply as an ‘ethic’ that would form the 
moral basis for the New South African society (in contrast to apartheid South Africa) 
it was understood in terms of the more tangible social norms and practices that would 
stem from the adoption of this ‘ethic’ (O’Malley, 1999).  This kind of notion of 
democracy acts to reify the concept – defining it in terms of idealised end products, 
tangible outcomes and institutions (O’Malley, 1999).   
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What is perhaps more significant concerning this sort of ‘end product’ conception of 
democracy is the ways in which it reproduces liberal political ideology – with a focus 
on the individual rights to freedom and private property.  Dixon (1997), in his study 
of Hout Bay residents’ responses to the establishment of a squatter camp in their 
community, identifies a liberal discourse as one that privileges and protects the 
ideology of the inviolability of individual liberties and rights.  But it is important to 
remember that liberalism does not stand “apart from any particular moral and political 
agenda.  Rather it is a very particular moral agenda (privileging the individual over 
the community, the cognitive over the affective, the abstract over the particular)” 
(Fish 1994, pp. 137-138).   
 
At the same time one must comment on the manner in which a necessary connection 
between democracy and liberal values and individual freedoms is assumed to exist.  
To clarify, people tend to assume that democracy must equate with civil liberties and 
the protection of individual rights (more often than not, those concerned with private 
property).  However, Richard Arneson (1993) puts forward an interesting thesis on the 
nature of this assumed relationship.  He argues, “Democratic rights are protective. 
Their primary function is to safeguard other, more fundamental rights” (Arneson, 
1993, p. 118).  Yet different people will always have conflicting interests, and 
therefore there must exist a hierarchy of rights, with some being more fundamental 
than others (Arneson, 1993).  Thus it falls to a ‘democratic’ government to regulate 
and safeguard this hierarchical arrangement of individual rights through its 
constitution and judicial process. The ‘ins and outs’ of democratic governance and 
law making notwithstanding (such a discussion being outside the scope of this thesis), 
Arneson (1993) thus views democracy as purely instrumental, and there is therefore 
no fundamental connection between democracy as a political system, and the 
realisation of individual rights and freedoms for all (Sugden, 1993).  
 
Yet much of the rhetoric – both party-political and public – concerning democracy 
makes just this sort of claim and the ideological argument is that democracy as an 
ideal is desirable because in practice, it delivers individual rights and liberty.  The 
opinion of this thesis is that a discussion of the constructions of democracy should 
examine the ideological ways of speaking that underpin these constructions, as well as 
pay attention to the social practices and institutions supported by such modes of 
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articulation.  To this end it is deemed necessary to examine the manner in which 
liberal ideology commingles with, supports, and is in turn supported by, apparently 
contradictory, exclusionary and/or prejudicial ideologies and ways of talk.  
   
This would suggest that ideology is dynamic and fluid.  Fairclough (1995) argues this 
very point when discussing the relationship between ideology, hegemony and 
discourse.  In order to elaborate this relationship, Fairclough argues that it is 
necessary to view ideology neither as a product of the underlying structures of 
language practice, nor as a result of fluid discursive events, but rather as a result of the 
interaction of both of these elements (Fairclough, 1995).  This approach to 
understanding the nature of the relationship between ideology and discourse thus 
leads to a dialectical view whereby “discourse is shaped by structures, but also 
contributes to shaping and reshaping them, to reproducing and transforming them” 
(Fairclough, 1995, p. 73).  This creates a dynamic view of the manner in which 
ideology informs and is informed by the discursive practices that individuals employ.  
Thus, Fairclough writes that “rather than attributing specific and fixed ideological 
‘contents’ to elements, ideology is seen more dynamically as the shifting relationship 
of discoursal practices to hegemonic (and more local-institutional) struggle”  
(Fairclough, 1995, p. 81).  In stating this view, Fairclough (1995) draws on Foucault’s 
argument regarding the multiple meanings and uses of discourses.  Foucault (in 
Fairclough, 1995, p. 81) argues the following point: 
  
Discourses are tactical elements or blocks operating in the field of force relations; there 
can exist different and even contradictory discourses within the same strategy; they can, 
on the contrary, circulate without changing their form from one strategy to another, 
opposing strategy. 
 
It is important to bear this argument in mind when investigating Eastern Cape white 
commercial farmers’ discursive constructions of the notion of democracy, particularly 
when such constructions appear to be vested in liberal ideological values – values that 
are seemingly used to support both positive and negative views towards democracy 
and the racial ‘Other’. Much of the discursive analysis carried out for this thesis will 
focus on the manner in which liberal ideology is used in the discourse of the farmers 
interviewed, and to what ends this ideological resource is drawn upon. 
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 In a related vein, Wetherell & Potter’s (1992) analysis of discourses of race and 
racism in New Zealand also addresses this issue of the variable ways in which liberal 
ideology is drawn upon to support both racist and anti-racist attitudes and beliefs.  
Their departure point is the argument that racist attitudes and beliefs are by no means 
monolithic or necessarily contribute to the articulation of a coherent set of discourses. 
Instead, Wetherell & Potter (1992, p. 176) focus on the ambivalences and 
inconsistencies in individual accounts and use this to argue that “racism is flexible; its 
manifestations change as material conditions shift and as the agenda for debate 
become successfully redefined through various forms of struggle.”  It is thus not too 
difficult to argue the point that liberal ideology and beliefs or ideas that are seemingly 
the antithesis of liberalism are in fact not really all that incommensurate.   Thus, a 
liberal ideology incorporating notions such as “individual rights and freedoms and the 
importance of contracts and equality [that are] taken for granted” (Wetherell & Potter, 
1992, p. 181) can be used discursively to argue for what would seemingly appear to 
be the precise opposite – the protection of the rights and freedoms of a few to the 
exclusion of true equality for all.  It is this kind of ideological positioning that shall be 
explored in the analysis of Eastern Cape white commercial farmers’ discourses 
concerning democracy.  
 
If this thesis is to provide an analysis of the relationship between liberal ideology and 
expressions of racist attitudes, it is necessary to discuss the notion of racism in a little 
more detail.  Wetherell & Potter (1992) provide a critique of contemporary social 
science investigations of racism that posit the development of a new, modern, 
ambivalent sort of racist attitude, as opposed to historical, more openly bigoted 
attitudes.  This modern racism approach, according to Wetherell & Potter (1992), 
argues that contemporary expressions of racism and racist attitudes have become 
subtler and sometimes contradictory – to the point that such expressions seem to be 
the expression of attitudinal ambivalence toward the racial ‘Other’.  Such 
ambivalence is seen as “the outcome of a conflict between anti-black sentiments and 
liberal values” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 195).   
 
Such an explanation would, at first glance, appear to have some validity when 
accounting for the discursive strategies employed by certain groups within a society to 
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express attitudes or opinions that, as a result of broad political changes, have become 
widely regarded as socially unacceptable. Yet, as Wetherell & Potter (1992) argue, 
such an explanatory account of contemporary expressions of racism ascribe to the 
idea that racism and racist attitudes are purely the result of psychological factors and 
are therefore cognitive-affective in nature. Additionally, liberal values are viewed as 
being diametrically opposed to such prejudice to the effect that “liberal values are 
seen as attenuating anti-black emotions and related cognitions to produce the 
conflicted phenomenon of modern racism” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 197).  
 
What such cognitive conflict supposedly produces is an ambivalence of attitude to the 
effect that openly bigoted attitudes and the expressions thereof become replaced by 
superficial tolerance, combined with more subtle expressions of prejudice.  Whillock 
& Slayden (1995, p. xi) argue: “As routine expressions of hate are pushed out of 
public discourse, they re-emerge in more subtle and less newsworthy ways.” What 
this means is that even though racism has become taboo, racist attitudes and beliefs 
still underlie many seemingly innocuous and well-meaning attempts by whites to 
account for societal change.    
 
However, this ‘weakening’ of strong racism through the widespread adoption of 
liberal values, and its replacement by a more subtle form of prejudice is not 
necessarily the case, as has been alluded to previously.  Liberal values, instead of 
providing more ‘rational’ beliefs and attitudes (such as equality, the protection of 
individual rights, free enterprise, and the like) to counteract the affectively based, and 
therefore less rational, prejudicial attitudes associated with racism, instead provide 
individuals with a particular set of discursive resources that can be used to construct 
even the circumstances brought about by democratic political and social change in a 
negative light.   
 
As such, Wetherell & Potter (1992, p. 197) argue the following: 
 
Discourse analysis locates the conflicts and dilemmas within the argumentative and 
rhetorical resources available in a ‘liberal’ and ‘egalitarian’ society … The conflict is not 
between a feeling and a value, between psychological drives and socially acceptable 
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expressions or between emotions and politics, but between competing frameworks for 
articulating social, political, and ethical questions. 
 
An example of the sort of discursive practices currently being referred to has been 
highlighted by Dixon (1997) in his study of Hout Bay residents’ responses to the 
emergence of informal settlements in close proximity to their homes. In their 
responses to Dixon’s research questions, residents draw upon the liberal notion of the 
individual’s ‘inviolable’ right to private property, accorded by the state, yet use this 
liberal idea to argue for the removal and exclusion a group of people and their 
property from a particular area.  Residents of Hout Bay feel threatened because the 
very same state that accords them the right to private property is seen as threatening 
the sanctity of this property and this right by refusing to remove/relocate informal 
settlements.   
 
And in this conflict lies the crux of an ideological dilemma between liberalism and 
what is commonly accepted as ‘democratic change’ within South Africa since 1994. 
The conflict arises due to the introduction of legislation pertinent to a variety of 
circumstances within South African society that is, strictly speaking, in conflict with 
an orthodox liberal ideology, encompassed by the notions of advancement – in terms 
of material achievements, as well as the attainment of individual rights – through 
either market forces (unfettered by state interventions) or through merit (likewise 
exempt from state interference).  Yet some of South Africa’s legislation flies in the 
face of these values and paves the way for state intervention and control in these 
realms – the Affirmative Action policy being a prime example of such interventions.  
This argument shall be returned to and elaborated upon.  
 
Thus, the focus of the analysis that is to follow will be on attempting to elucidate the 
ramifications of this conflict between liberalism and ‘democracy’ as a metaphor for 
post-1994 South Africa for Eastern Cape white commercial farmers by paying 
attention to the various manners in which liberal discourses are employed to argue 
both for and against the ‘democratic change’ that has occurred in South Africa since 
1994.    
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It would seem that a key feature of the variable use of liberal ideology to argue both 
for and against democratic change is that there appears to be an assumption (on both 
sides of such an argument) of the fundamentally obvious, inviolable and inarguably 
correct nature of liberal values.  It seems to be taken for granted that the liberal rights 
and freedoms should be accorded to all individuals without question, and yet at the 
same time such a universally required application of liberal values creates a curious 
double bind that finds expression in individual’s attitudes toward and opinions of the 
country’s broader political culture.    
 
The broader societal sanction of liberal values and ideology in a sense demands that 
individuals within that society subscribe to the same values.  South Africa’s 
democratic government has on many levels (political and economic) adopted liberal 
values and enshrined them within the country’s constitution – individual rights and 
freedoms are legally protected and legally enforced.  Yet, Wetherell & Potter (1992, 
p. 189) make an interesting point: “to define something as compulsory is, in terms of 
the liberal discourse of freedom and human rights, to define it negatively. Compulsion 
is automatically rhetorically bad.”  The offshoot of this is that individuals who were 
previously members of a privileged sector of society may well use liberal ideology to 
justify that privilege, but then find that the same liberal ideology of rights and 
freedoms creates circumstances that threaten that selfsame privilege – as was 
illustrated by Dixon (1997).     
 
This may lead to the formation and articulation of prejudiced attitudes.  The taken for 
granted nature of previously held privilege and the expression of negative affect 
towards the racial ‘Other’ who seems to be threatening that privilege reflects what 
King (2001) refers to as ‘dysconscious racism’. King (2001, p. 296) argues that 
“dysconsciousness is an uncritical habit of mind that justifies inequity and 
exploitation by accepting the existing order of things as a given.”  In this way, 
dysconscious racism “tacitly accepts dominant white norms and privileges,” (King, 
2001, p. 297).   
 
It is perhaps even possible to explain this habit of ‘dysconsciousness’ – a way of 
enabling the use of liberal discourse for seemingly diametrically opposed ends –as a 
corollary of Fanon’s (1967) idea of the oppressed consciousness of the colonised.  
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Yet, white commercial farmers in South Africa are in no way ‘the colonised’.  More 
accurately, they could be taken to represent – even today, ten years into a free and 
democratic country – the oppressive consciousness of the coloniser. “The colonisation 
of the mind is manifested in a manner in which a people’s history is denied, and they 
are made to feel inferior and incapable of challenging the colonial power” (Ahluwalia, 
2001, p. 41).  The other side to this process is that the consciousness of the oppressor 
is also shaped by the colonial discourse to construct and maintain an ideological 
subject position of power and superiority for whites.   
 
What emerges from the above arguments is the idea that members of a previously 
advantaged sector of a society in which racial segregation and prejudice was a taken 
for granted ideological cornerstone, may still defensively draw upon racist ideas to 
frame their discontent with new governmental policies that conflict with an orthodox 
liberal ideology, commonly assumed to be synonymous with the notion of 
‘democracy’.   
 
1.4) The Current Context 
With the above discussions concerning the concepts of democracy, political culture, 
liberal ideology and racism complete, a brief description of the current context in 
which this research has taken place will be offered as a means to tie the preceding 
discussions together into a more coherent whole.  
 
The Eastern Cape is South Africa’s third largest province, and one of the poorest. 
Under the Apartheid regime, much of the Xhosa population of the province was 
relocated to the two Homelands of Transkei and Ciskei.  Black commercial 
agriculture was effectively undermined and relegated to subsistence farming in the 
Homeland areas.  Much of the African labour force was taken up into the migrant 
labour system and many men went off to work on the mines of the Witwatersrand, or 
in the agricultural and industrial areas of the Western cape.  The only avenue for those 
remaining in the rural Eastern Cape was to work as agricultural labourers on White 
commercial farms.  
 
The Eastern Cape has a long history of land appropriation under British colonial rule, 
most notably during the Frontier Wars of the 19th century, and the subsequent 
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establishment of vast areas of the province designated to be allocated to British and 
other colonial settlers.   This trend, established in the mid- and late-1800’s by British 
colonial government, was continued in the twentieth century by the white South 
African government.  The net result was that a viable class of black farmers were 
marginalized and proletarianised by a complex web of legislation and social practice 
in the early twentieth century expansion of racialised agrarian capitalism (Beinart, 
Delius and Trapido, 1986; Bundy, 1979).  Significantly, however, the bulk of this 
appropriation of land occurred in the 19th century (i.e. before 1913), with the result 
that land in much of the Eastern Cape cannot be eligible for Land Restitution claims, 
but only for land reform policies.   
 
Government support for white commercial farming in the Eastern Cape came in many 
guises – the establishment of the two homelands of Transkei and Ciskei, favourable 
labour legislation that maintained early colonial labour and power relations between 
farmers and labourers, infrastructural support such as the construction of a vast 
railway and roads system through very rural areas so as to enable the transport of 
wool to the harbours of East London and Port Elizabeth, as well as price regulation 
for agricultural produce such as wool (the chief commercial agricultural product of 
the region).  From this it can be argued that the history of twentieth century South 
African commercial agriculture is the history of state intervention and support (Jeeves 
& Crush, 1997).  Interestingly, the results of the analysis show that white commercial 
farmers in the Eastern Cape still feel this to be the case – the only difference being 
that since 1994, state intervention in agriculture has been perceived as being geared 
towards undermining their position, and supporting an emerging class of black 
commercial farmers.  
 
With Democratic change came the dismantling of this state supported privilege: the 
dissolution of the Homelands, fair labour legislation enforcing changes in the labour 
relationships between farmers and labourers, the privatisation of parastatal agencies 
such as Spoornet resulting in the disuse and closure of key railway lines, land reform 
legislation that sees farms being bought by the state and sold under favourable 
conditions to individuals without legislatively supported historical claims to it, 
changes in the treatment of labour tenants, as well as the establishment of procedural 
impediments to eviction of squatters under the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and  
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Unlawful Occupation of Land Act (1998); and an increase in violent crimes 
committed against farmers – to name but a few of the changes in material conditions 
that white commercial  farmers in the Eastern Cape have begun experiencing.  
 
Thus it would appear that for Eastern Cape farmers there is a very real discrepancy 
between the ideal of democracy, as discussed previously, and the material effects of 
democratic change.  Liberal ideology (assumed to underlie the principles of 
democracy), an ethos of individual rights and freedoms which this particular sector of 
South African society has always been accustomed to, and which has been taken for 
granted, now seems to be in conflict with so-called ‘democratic’ legislation and 
institutionalised policies that run counter to it. 
 
The discourse analysis that follows in chapter three is therefore an attempt to illustrate 
the manner in which the white commercial farmers who participated in this research 
engage with this ideological conflict through an exploration of the discourses they 
articulate surrounding the notion of democracy.  The exact manner in which this 
analysis has been conducted is explained in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Orientation & Research Methodology 
 
2.1) Ontological and Epistemological Considerations 
This thesis made use of qualitative research methods and aligns itself with a social 
constructionist paradigm.  To begin with, a qualitative research approach in the social 
sciences has a vastly different philosophical and theoretical basis to that held by the 
more quantitative and experimentally based research paradigm. According to 
Henwood & Pidgeon (1994, p. 227), qualitative research is “based upon the search for 
detailed description, seeking to represent reality through the eyes of the participants 
and to be sensitive to the complexities of behaviour and meaning in context.”  Thus, 
in this form of research, the individual’s subjectivity as well as the co-construction of 
knowledge through the relationship between the researcher and participant is regarded 
as highly significant.  
 
Within this broad orientation towards research and the production of accounts of 
reality, there exists a great diversity of theoretical positions and approaches. One such 
approach (and indeed the approach adopted by this research) is that of social 
constructionism, which “focuses chiefly on the operations of language, not merely as 
a means of describing everyday social reality, but also as a means that individuals and 
institutions have at their disposal to actively set about constructing social reality” 
(Bohmke, 2001, p. 14). In this way, social constructionism would argue, “the human 
life-world is fundamentally constituted in language and that language itself should 
therefore be the focus of study” (Terre Blanche & Durrheim, 1999, p. 149). Such a 
study would focus its analyses on the ways in which language is used to construct 
objects in the world and the material effects of such linguistic constructions 
(Henwood & Pidgeon, 1994). 
 
As such, the social world is regarded as “a kind of language, that is, a system of 
meanings and practices that construct reality” (Terre Blanche & Durrheim, 1999, p. 
151). Social constructionist investigations are therefore aimed at the identification and 
deconstruction of these shared systems of meanings, which are used both to construct 
and interpret the social world (Bohmke, 2001). Such investigations can be undertaken 
through the utilisation of the methodological orientation of discourse analysis, which 
is discussed in more detail below.  
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2.2) Research Questions: 
The questions informing this research revolved around the attitudes towards, opinions 
about, and perceptions of democracy by white commercial farmers in the Eastern 
Cape, in order to identify how this particular strata of agrarian society: i) 
conceptualise the process of social and political change; ii) understand their place as 
subjects within the new democratic order; and finally, iii) what ideological 
frameworks inform their constructions of self and others.  Three basic questions were 
posed to the participants in order to elicit their ideas concerning democracy. These 
questions centred on: 1) the individuals’ definitions of democracy; 2) the impact that 
democracy had had on their lives; and 3) whether (and how) they thought that 
democracy was working, or not.  It is important to mention at this juncture that the 
above research questions did not expect participants to formally theorise definitions of 
the concept of democracy, nor were their notions of democracy compared to already 
existing political theory.  Instead, the notion of democracy was utilised as a useful 
metaphorical lens through which to focus their discussions of post-1994 South 
African society.  
 
2.3) Recruitment of Participants: 
Data was garnered from fifteen male farmers and their spouses in a series of thirteen 
brief interviews, conducted in the Emalahleni area (around the former Indwe / 
Wodehouse districts).  These interviews were audiotaped, transcribed and analysed 
according to Parker’s (1992) method of discourse analysis.  
 
Participants in this research were recruited on a convenience basis.  The researcher, 
being familiar with the area and the farmers resident there, approached prospective 
participants telephonically and explained to them the nature of the research question, 
and asked if they would be prepared to take part in the research endeavour.  Once 
participants had assented to the research, interviews were arranged and conducted.  
Participants were again informed of the research question and the purposes to which 
the research would be put.  Permission for the tape-recording of the interviews was 
obtained, and participants were assured that both the recordings and transcriptions 
would be kept confidential.  It was also explained to participants that the tape 
recordings would be erased after a stipulated period of time (6 months).  
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While it is important to acknowledge the individual vicissitudes as well as regional 
and class differences of white commercial farmers, a relatively stable and moderately 
prosperous community inhabits the area in which the research was conducted. So 
while discourse analysis avoids claims of generalisability, it is anticipated that the 
discussion of the main findings that follows will resonate with other similar contexts. 
 
2.4) Data Collection – Semi-structured Interviewing 
Data collection was conducted via the use of semi-structured interviews designed to 
elicit participant’s ideas, attitudes, perceptions and experiences of democracy as a 
metaphor for socio-political change.  The interviews varied in length, but averaged an 
approximate duration of fifteen to twenty minutes. The interview schedules were 
developed on the basis of a review of literature on the research topic, and were to be 
used to provide a structured yet flexible framework for the interviews. This data 
collection technique was deemed best suited to the purposes of this research in that 
interviews provide detailed, in-depth and contextually embedded data, which can then 
be subjected to the discourse analytical procedure.  
 
Constructionist research tends to take the view that interviews provide the researcher 
with the opportunity to explore the constructed accounts of participants’ life-worlds 
and experiences through a dialogical process of shared meaning-making (Kvale, 
1996). As regards the analysis of peoples’ discourses concerning a particular topic of 
discussion, the interview is seen as “an arena within which particular linguistic 
patterns can come to the fore” (Terre Blanche & Durrheim, 1999, p. 153). What is 
more, the meanings created in the interview situation are “co-constructed between the 
interviewer and interviewee. These meanings are, moreover, not only constructed by 
the two people in the interview, but are products of a larger social system for which 
these individuals act as relays” (Terre Blanche & Durrheim, 1999, p. 153). Thus, in-
depth, semi-structured interviews provided an ideal data collection technique for 
accomplishing the stated objectives of the research project. 
 
2.5) Data Analysis – Discourse Analysis  
Discourse analysis, as an analytic perspective, is particularly suited to the sort of 
constructionist research that was conducted for this thesis. This is so because of the 
manner in which discourse analysis aims at the deconstruction of individuals’ 
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accounts of an experience or phenomenon.  As such, a study or analysis of discourses 
about a certain phenomenon or experience must focus on discussing people’s 
opinions, attitudes and accounts as produced versions of reality. Therefore, “discourse 
analysis is concerned with the ways in which language constructs objects, subjects 
and experiences…Discourse analysts conceptualise language as constitutive of 
experience rather than representational or reflective” (Willig, 1999, p. 2). Ian Parker 
(1992) says of discourses that they “do not simply describe the social world, but 
categorise it, they bring phenomena into sight … Discourses provide frameworks for 
debating the value of one way of talking about reality over other ways” (p. 5). For 
Parker (1992), the process of discourse analysis is valuable in that it “deliberately 
systematises different ways of talking so we can understand them better” (p. 5).  
 
Discourse analysis therefore focuses primarily on texts – arguing that individual 
accounts of experience, agency and subjectivity are structured by systems of 
representation, most notably language. In this way, it is argued - somewhat counter-
intuitively - that language as a social phenomenon produces and reproduces meaning 
independently from the intentions of the individual language user (Parker, 1994). As 
such, our realities and individual subjectivities are constituted and informed by the 
ways in which we speak them. Or perhaps more accurately, they speak us. It is thus 
possible to analyse our world and social phenomena as a system of texts (Parker 
1994). 
 
A further feature of discourse analysis described by Willig (1999, p. 2) is that “there 
is always more than one way of describing something and our choice of how to use 
words to package perceptions and experiences gives rise to particular versions of 
events and of reality.”  
  
Data analysis of the interview material was conducted using a combination of the 
discourse analytic procedures put forward by both Potter & Wetherell (1988), as well 
as those proposed by Parker (1992). Potter & Wetherell’s guidelines for the analysis 
of discourse are aimed at providing an account of what people do with the language 
and discourses they employ. It is thus an attempt to “study language in use,” 
(Wetherell, 2001, p. 3). This primary analytical orientation towards the uses to which 
language is put prompts a particular method of discourse analysis (Potter & 
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Wetherell, 1987). This method consists of a close reading of the interview material 
and the coding and classification of the collected interview material into themes on an 
inclusive basis. Once this is accomplished, a closer examination of the themes is to be 
conducted in order to analyse them in terms of function, variability, and construction, 
followed by a further discussion of the interpretative repertoires used (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1988).  
 
Function refers to the fact that “people do things with their discourse” (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1988, p. 169) both intentionally (using specific discourses for specific 
purposes, to produce and perpetuate specific understandings and explanations) and 
unintentionally, in that the use of particular discourses often have wider social and 
ideological implications (Potter & Wetherell, 1988).  But the process of analysing the 
function of discourses is not as straightforward as it may ay first appear.  It is rare, if 
not indeed non-existent, that individuals hold uniform and unwavering views about a 
phenomenon across all possible situations or contexts.  Discourses can be put to 
differing uses.  
 
“If talk is oriented to many different functions, global and specific, any examination 
of language over time reveals considerable variation,” (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 
33).  Variation refers to the observation that “what people say and write will be 
different according to what they are doing” (Potter & Wetherell, 1988, p. 171).  Potter 
and Wetherell (1988, p. 171) go on to state: “As variation is a consequence of 
function it can be used as an analytic clue to what function is being performed in a 
particular stretch of discourse.”  
 
The third aspect of discourse that is subjected to analysis in this approach is that of the 
particular ways in which the talk is structured.  The term construction is used to refer 
to the manner in which “language is put together, constructed, for purposes and to 
achieve particular consequences” (Potter & Wetherell, 1988, p.171).  Using language 
for particular ends – in order to create specific accounts of reality in differing contexts 
– necessarily involves the construction of versions, indicated by language variations 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987).  In this way an analysis of the specific way in which a 
discourse is constructed – what kind of language is used, when it is used, as well as 
how and with or by whom – provides clues as to the variation and the function to 
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which it is being put and thus provides a detailed, multifaceted approach to the 
analysis of the discourse.  By analysing the construction, we are able to show how 
already existing linguistic resources are drawn on to inform individual accounts, we 
can analyse how individuals go about exercising a degree of agency in the 
construction of their accounts of a phenomenon and we can gain insight into the ways 
in which people orient their talk to do specific things (Potter & Wetherell, 1987).  
 
The above three dimensions of a discourse interact in such a way as to constitute an 
interpretative repertoire and such a repertoire incorporates patterns of interpretations 
and explanations that individuals utilise in their construction of their social realities 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1988).  “Repertoires can be seen as the building blocks speakers 
use for constructing versions of actions, cognitive processes and other phenomena.  
Any particular repertoire is constituted out of a restricted range of terms used in a 
specific stylistic and grammatical fashion” (Potter & Wetherell, 1988, p.172).  The 
identification and elaboration of different interpretative repertoires amounts to an 
integrated description of the ways in which a discourse is employed as a resource to 
construct an explanation, description or understanding of the social world and 
different objects and subjects within it (Bohmke, 2001). 
 
In addition to Potter & Wetherell’s (1987) orientation towards function, variability 
and construction of discursive repertoires, it is deemed necessary to pay some 
attention to issues of power.  Such an analysis would be implicitly related to a 
discussion of the functions to which discourses are put, as doing something implies 
the exercise of power.  However, a more in-depth and explicit examination of the 
power – and ideological – dimensions of the discursive practices under investigation 
would enrich the analysis, and serve to further refine the attempt to answer the 
research questions stated above.  In order to perform such an analysis, it is necessary 
– in addition to Potter & Wetherell’s method of analysis (1987) – to incorporate 
elements of a Foucauldian-inspired discourse analytical approach.  
 
In order to do this, specific attention in the analysis will be devoted to elements of the 
discourse that relate to power, ideology and institutions.  The first consideration in 
this regard would be Foucault’s notions concerning the interrelationship between 
power and knowledge.  Foucault saw “knowledge as inextricably enmeshed in 
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relations of power because it [is] always being applied to the regulation of social 
conduct in practice,” (Hall, 2001, p. 75).  In this way, discourses – because they exist 
separately from the individual who draws upon them to construct his/her accounts of 
reality – serve in a very real sense to delimit and regulate the manner in which people 
can speak about phenomena.  
 
Additionally, discourses incorporate an ideological dimension: values, attitudes, 
vested interests and moral codes belonging to various producers of knowledge and 
discourse.  It is when this ideological dimension becomes codified through 
widespread usage, that the discourse gains institutional and power dimensions as well.  
Foucault argued, “Knowledge linked to power, not only assumes the authority of ‘the 
truth’ but has the power to make itself true.  All knowledge, once applied in the real 
world has real effects, and in that sense at least ‘becomes true’.  Knowledge, once 
used to regulate the conduct of others, entails constraint, regulation and the 
disciplining of practices,” (Hall, 2001, p. 76). 
 
Parker (1992) suggests that an examination of the ways in which discourses function 
in terms of institutions, power and ideology is a vital element in developing an 
understanding of discourses as social practices.  Therefore, attention needs to be paid 
to questions concerning the institutions that are reinforced or subverted when a 
particular discourse is used or not used; the power relationships involved in terms of 
whose voices or accounts of reality are supported or promoted and whose are 
invalidated by the recourse to a particular construction; and examining the manner in 
which various discourses function in collusion to create a version of ‘truth’, and how 
dominant groups make use of this to promote their particular versions as ‘truth’ 
(Parker, 1992).  
 
A critical question posed by discourse analytical research regards the reproduction of 
power relations within individual constructions of the social world.  The primacy 
given to language as a medium through which we construct explanations and 
understandings of our social realities also means that language becomes that which 
“constitutes who we are, constructs the positions we occupy, is the medium by which 
we interact with other people and understand ourselves” (Burman, Kottler, Levett & 
Parker, 1997, p. 7).  But more than this, discourses – precisely because they are social 
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phenomena – extend beyond subjectivity and individual agency to reproduce existing 
institutions, ideologies and power relations through individual accounts (Burman, 
Kottler, Levett & Parker, 1997).  It is this aspect of discourse analysis that Parker so 
adroitly explicates.  
 
Heavily indebted to Foucault, Parker’s method of discourse analysis goes beyond the 
discussion of the ways in which subjectivity is constructed, and examines the manner 
in which different discourses function, in collusion or competition, to reproduce 
particular power relations and ideological positions for its subjects (Parker, 1992). 
This in turn opens up the analysis to not only examine the dominant ideologies 
reproduced in talk, but also to the strategies of resistance and the interplay of power 
relations.  Yet, regarding these ideas concerning subjectivities and ideological 
positioning, Fairclough, Graham, Lemke & Wodak (2004, p. 4) point out that 
analyses of discourse have a tendency to separate “features of text and talk from 
social issues and contexts, and from the social theories and research that purports to 
address these.”  To counter this problem, these authors argue that   
 
The analysis of text and talk are never an end in themselves; that discourse is an inherently 
relational term for one moment of the social which has no existence except through its 
relation to other terms; and that discourse analysis is therefore social analysis with a focus 
on the moment of discourse (Fairclough et al., 2004, pp. 4-5). 
 
However, this does still not conclusively settle the question of the validity of 
discourse analytical research.  McKenna (2004) writes that one of the major 
methodological criticisms that has been levelled at critical discourse studies concerns 
the linkages between texts and their contexts, as well as the size and selection 
(representivity) of the textual material upon which the analysis is based.  There are, 
however, four aspects of an analysis of discourse that can be used to address this 
concern over validity.  These elements, as explained by McKenna (2004) are: 1) 
convergence (the degree of coherence between the various categories of discourse 
identified by the analysis); 2) agreement (the ability of the analysis to convince native 
speakers of the discourse of its validity); 3) coverage (the degree to which the 
conclusions of the analysis can be transferred to related sets of data) and finally; 4) 
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linguistic detail (the extent to which the analysis focuses on the linguistic structures of 
the text).  These questions shall be returned to in the concluding chapter of this thesis.   
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Chapter 3: Analysis & Discussion of the Findings 
 
The following chapter of this thesis is devoted to a discussion and analysis of the 
responses elicited by the interview questions. The discussion is arranged thematically 
according to the two main interpretative repertoires that were identified in the course 
of the analysis.  Initial expectations on the part of the researcher were that there 
would be a high degree of homogeneity and convergence in participant’s discursive 
constructions of democracy.  Instead there proved to be a fair amount of diversity in 
these accounts.  Cursory analysis of the gathered interview texts showed it would be 
possible to divide responses and participants into two broad sets – those who are 
broadly optimistic and positive about democracy, and those who are generally 
negative and pessimistic.  
 
However, when it comes to the various discursive practices employed these two 
broad sets of responses are by no means mutually exclusive. Indeed, as will be 
shown, many of the ideological assumptions informing these accounts are strikingly 
similar in terms of their recourse to liberal values and ideals.  The difference lies in 
their tenor, their formulation and the variability of the functions to which the 
discourses are put (Potter & Wetherell, 1987).  To this end, the ensuing discussion of 
the discourse analysis conducted on the gathered interview texts will be arranged with 
reference to the underlying ideological positions and will therefore proceed by 
initially providing a discussion of the use of liberal values to support negative 
critiques of democratic change.  Following this, an explication of the manner in 
which the same liberal ideology is utilised to positively support democratic change 
will be offered.   
 
Furthermore while these differences are heuristically explored between the two poles 
of optimistic versus pessimistic, it is anticipated that this type of study could in future 
be augmented by the inclusion of data from other groupings of research participants, 
possibly across age cohorts, race or a rural-urban split.   
 
3.1) Democracy: ‘It’s a hell of a bugger-up’  
This particular interpretative repertoire, characterised by the articulation of a 
generally pessimistic attitude toward democracy and democratic change, clearly 
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displays the kind of ideological conflict that participants in this research are trying to 
reconcile.  As mentioned earlier, individual subject positions are constrained by 
liberal ideology in two conflicting ways.  On the one hand, the officially sanctioned 
discourse and ideal of liberalism that is being promoted on an ideological level by the 
country’s government compels individuals to recognise the individual rights and 
freedoms of all members of society.  On the other hand, the implementation of 
institutional reforms in the form of policies that appear to be distinctly un-liberal is 
threatening the selfsame individual rights of this particular sector of society.  This 
conflict is expressed in the ways in which participants articulate their negative and 
pessimistic attitudes toward democracy, and in some extreme cases there is even 
recourse to overt expression of prejudiced attitudes.  
 
3.1.1) Liberalism, rights and freedoms 
In this first, pessimistic repertoire, participants’ definitions of democracy tend to 
centre on individual rights and freedoms, evoking what Dixon (1997) has identified as 
a liberal discourse – one that privileges and protects the ideology of the inviolability 
of individual liberties and rights. What participants appear to be doing with the use of 
these discursive strategies is equating liberal discourses of rights and freedoms with 
the notion of democracy to create a particular argumentative framework in which 
democratic change and democracy, as a metaphor for post-1994 South Africa, can be 
critiqued.  This is done through an expression of the ideological conflict inherent in 
this notion of ‘liberal democracy’ – a conflict between the protection of individual 
rights, and the accordance of those rights to all. The following two extracts from 
interview transcripts illustrate this equation of democracy with a liberal discourse of 
rights and freedoms: 
 
Extract 1 
I always had it that democracy is when you’ve got a free country, free vote, free […] you 
know? That’s the way I saw it. 
 
Extract 2 
I think it’s people that, you know, have their own rights and can exercise their rights […] you 
know, that they can feel free to […] in a controlled atmosphere, to be able to speak their mind 
and be able to do, and be able to achieve things as well. And to be able to receive. 
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Both of these extracts, as well as other responses to the interview questions reveal a 
particular conception of the notion of democracy – that of individual rights and 
freedoms, encompassed and reinforced by a discourse of liberalism. But it is 
important to remember that liberalism does not stand “apart from any particular moral 
and political agenda. Rather it is a very particular moral agenda (privileging the 
individual over the community, the cognitive over the affective, the abstract over the 
particular)” (Fish 1994, p. 137-138). 
 
Furthermore, this kind of substantive notion of democracy acts to reify the concept – 
defining it in terms of idealised end products, tangible outcomes and institutions. 
O’Malley (1999), in discussing the results of focus group surveys concerning 
democracy conducted with black South African participants in 1992, notes that 
respondents’ ideas about democracy also took on this form. O’Malley (1999, p. 123) 
explains: “Democracy was widely interpreted as the antonym for apartheid. It 
encapsulated the opposite of apartheid … Participants did not see democracy as a 
means, but an end; not as a process, but as a set of goals, accomplishments, results.”  
 
As such, democracy was constructed not simply as an ‘ethic’ that would form the 
moral basis for the New South African society (in contrast to apartheid South Africa) 
it was understood in terms of the more tangible social norms and practices that would 
stem from the adoption of this ‘ethic’ (O’Malley, 1999). Significantly, this 
conceptualisation finds symmetry and is echoed in the illocutions of white farmers – a 
class of citizens often identified with more racialised oppression than other white 
South Africans. 
 
Already here, we can see the development of a tension between substantive 
definitions of democracy (focused on the concretely observable end products, or the 
minutiae of the functioning of a democratic political system) and a more ideal notion 
of democracy in which the values and ideals of a liberal ideology (i.e. the protection 
of individual rights and freedoms) are upheld.  It is important to reiterate that the 
former does not necessarily result in the latter, and that these two may in fact be in 
ideological conflict.     
 
 32
However, the view of democracy as end result (and the very antithesis of apartheid) is 
seen from a slightly different perspective, as evident in the following extracts wherein 
the respondents claim the mantel of victim:  
 
Extract 3 
I see democracy as simply a vice versa of what happened in the past. That’s how I see it and 
“baadjies vir boeties” doesn’t work. It’s not good for the country; it’s not good for the people. 
 
Extract 4 
But I do feel that maybe it’s just something that’s turned around from the past, from the olden 
days, from, you know, when the whites were in power. They were suppressing  - maybe you 
can call it, to use a hard word - suppressing the blacks in certain ways. I thought that was 
wrong. And I do feel that we, alternatively now, as whites are being suppressed … 
 
Extract 5 
I want to say I had a part in apartheid during my life, I might still live that way, but my 
grandchildren that are running around here didn’t have anything to do with it. And they are 
being punished. So apartheid is, the way I see it, is just something that’s been turned around. 
 
In this manner, participants are able to make sense of the ideological tension between 
substantive democracy and liberal values in a manner distinctive to this particular 
pessimistic repertoire.  As a result of what appears to be an inability to reconcile the 
conflict between the rights and freedoms of one versus the rights and freedoms of all, 
as well as an ‘unwillingness’ to concede to the dismantling of the political and 
economic status quo to which white commercial farmers became accustomed under 
apartheid, the participants that draw upon this negative interpretative repertoire have 
recourse to a discourse of ‘reverse discrimination’.  
 
3.1.2) Democracy as ‘apartheid in reverse’ 
This democracy as ‘reverse apartheid’ discourse, illustrates the contrast between 
liberal discourse (concerning the inviolability of individual rights and freedoms) and 
substantive definitions of democracy, and is used as a basis for negative and 
pessimistic articulations concerning democracy in contemporary South Africa. Thus, 
respondents rhetorically assert that democracy is not being properly implemented by 
the new state. Such arguments provide ideological support for lingering racist 
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attitudes and the continued use of prejudicial ways of speaking, as respondents argue 
that they are being discriminated against. This in turn reinforces a discourse of 
difference, an ‘apartheid discourse’ of race, culture, separateness and irreconcilable 
difference. 
 
Extract 6 
I see democracy as, let’s say, a country with different ethnic groups of people, that has to 
hold an election – a fair one – to put a government in office to look after everyone’s 
interests: minority groups as well as majority groups. Not just force things down people’s 
throats – whether it’s a language that you have to speak or, uh, something that you have 
to do. In other words, each group is entitled to their own – what do you call it? – culture, 
or way of living, right? 
 
Extract 7 
I’d like to phone in on these phone-in programmes, because I say that Afrikaans has been 
given the right to run their own radio, and they can do what they like and they can retain 
their own culture. We in the English, we are subjected to blacks running the radio 
stations. They don’t speak clear English like we speak English […] you know, those sorts 
of things worry me because I feel in time that’s going to break down […] I say if it’s got 
to be like that, sure, give them their own stations, let them run their own programmes as 
they are running now. Let us whites also have something that retains our culture. 
 
In these two extracts, we see the subjects drawing on notions of cultural pluralism, 
which should be ideologically distinguished from the ethic of multiculturalism 
encompassed by ideas such as the ‘Rainbow Nation’.  The latter seeks to foster an 
ideology that embraces diversity and tolerance, in which people from divergent social, 
cultural and political traditions can together feel part of a new and unified nation.  The 
former, however, seeks to re-establish notions of distinctness – hearkening back to the 
apartheid doctrine of ‘separate development’.  This constitutes an obstacle to the 
development of an ethos of democracy, as it illustrates “a tendency to see difference 
as a threat and to restrict political spaces in consequence” (Friedman, 2002, p. 25).  
To use Reynolds’ (1999) criteria for ‘consolidated democracy’, for these farmers, 
democracy is only constitutionally entrenched, without being attitudinally widely 
accepted or behaviourally practised.  
 
 34
On the other hand, however, it is important to note participants in this research appear 
to be articulating a position that holds the notion of a unified ‘Rainbow Nation’ as a 
threat, precisely because there does not seem to be any room in it for them.  
Participants expressing the above notion of democracy as reverse discrimination, base 
their argument upon the conflict engendered between a supposedly liberal democratic 
government, and the implementation of governmental policies that are definitely not 
liberal.   
 
It is these aspects of the political culture of post-1994 South Africa that these farmers 
have problems with.  As mentioned earlier, it is possible to discuss the notion of 
political culture in terms of several interrelated aspects – the “system culture, process 
culture and policy culture” (Almond, 1989).  On the level of the “system culture” (the 
attitudes toward the national community, the regime and authorities) it can be argued 
that the rhetoric of national unity, rights and freedoms for all, and the good of 
democracy (voiced by the government) tends to create a picture of a socio-political 
situation in which liberal values are in fact vindicated through the adoption of 
democracy.  Yet for farmers, it would appear that the “policy culture” (the outputs and 
outcomes of politics) of legislative changes that have impacted negatively upon them, 
tells a story that is far from liberal.   
 
Under a new, democratic political hegemony, policies have been implemented that: 
negatively impact upon white farmers’ abilities to get land bank loans; give 
preference to the financial assistance of ‘emerging’ black farmers; and threaten their 
assets through pressure from government to sell their farms for land reform.  Farmers 
have not simply been left alone to exist in a liberal political culture in which they 
persist with racist attitudes of their own accord.  Instead, they find themselves in a 
political culture that discriminates against them, albeit to bring about an eventual 
positive effect for the country as a whole.  There is thus a discrepancy for these 
farmers between the ideal “system culture” of liberal democracy, and the sometimes 
anti-liberal “policy culture” implemented to bring this state about.   
  
It is therefore interesting to note that all of the interviewees frame their responses in 
rigid terms of ‘us’ (whites and farmers) versus ‘them’ (blacks and government).  A 
apparent act of racial solidarity with the white male researcher – who is assumed to 
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empathise with these ideological views by virtue of being a member of the same racial 
group – this is also a classic example of the use of discourses of ‘Other’ (Riggins, 
1997) which are often (if not always) to be found at the basis of prejudice and racism.  
The rhetorical social practice of constructing the external / social ‘Other’ can be 
described as the reference to “all people the Self perceives as mildly or radically 
different (Riggins, 1997, p. 3).  Furthermore, Riggins (1997, p. 4) writes “Self and 
external Other may be understood as unique individuals (I and You) or as 
collectivities that are thought to share similar characteristics (We and They)”.   
 
In this sense, the practice of ‘Othering’ forms an integral part of the processes of 
prejudice, as it involves the perception and positioning in discourse of ‘different’ 
social groups.  In terms of this study, one of the focal points of this analysis tends to 
fall on the ways in which the racial ‘Other’ to the white participants is spoken of in 
association with the implementation of democracy, and the participants’ negative 
perceptions thereof.  What emerges is then the construction of the racial ‘Other’ as a 
vengeful and persecutory entity, responsible for the systematic implementation of 
‘reverse apartheid discrimination’. Yet, given the participants experience of 
discrimination under a “policy culture” that does not strictly adhere to a liberal 
ideology, such construction is perhaps understandable as a defensive subject 
positioning.   
 
The above extracts illustrate this discursive manoeuvring through the creation of 
ideological boundaries between their constructed subject positions and the ‘Other’, 
based upon notions of racial and, by extension, cultural difference.  It is argued, 
however, that these articulations of prejudice do not stem solely from an openly 
bigoted ideology of racial superiority, but are instead the result of a defensive 
positioning born out of the ideological tension created by the widespread adoption of 
liberal democracy, which, from the perspective of farmers, simultaneously and 
paradoxically appears to require the dismantling of individual privilege. 
 
3.1.3) Things are worse for farmers 
A further element of participants’ pessimism appears to derive from the fact that 
farmers utilise a discourse of being ‘systematically disadvantaged’ and worse off. 
Interviewees’ arguments make use of concrete illustrations to ‘prove’ just how much 
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worse off they are now, as opposed to the past.  At the same time however there is a 
reticence around how privileged they were in the past.  Yet, the occurrence of state 
intervention and support for commercial agriculture in the Eastern Cape has already 
been commented on by observers (Jeeves & Crush, 1997), and it is even possible to 
comment on current state intervention of a different kind today.  This attitude of 
reticence reflects what King (2001) refers to as ‘dysconscious racism’.  King (2001, p. 
296) argues that “dysconsciousness is an uncritical habit of mind that justifies 
inequity and exploitation by accepting the existing order of things as a given.”  In this 
way, dysconscious racism “tacitly accepts dominant white norms and privileges” 
(King, 2001, p 297).  As such, respondents do not view “policy culture” changes 
instituted under ‘democracy’ as an attempt to redress past inequality, but instead see 
them as an assault upon the uncritically accepted ‘norms’ that were for a long time the 
cornerstone of landed white South African society.  
 
Rhetorical points raised by these kind of arguments include: the collapse of 
infrastructure; theft of stock; problems with safety and security; labour laws; 
affirmative action; lack of subsidies; importing of foreign agricultural produce; 
increased running costs and decreased demand for produce.  This litany of localized 
concerns may, of course, on the scale of subjective reality be constructed as 
possessing a degree of validity, as they could be used to illustrate some of the failures 
of government – particularly at provincial level – to maintain infrastructure and basic 
services.  The factual accuracy of these arguments notwithstanding, it is less the 
arguments themselves than the ideological uses to which they are deployed that are of 
analytic interest here.  
 
Affirmative action and employment equity is seen as being discriminatory – again 
calling upon the ‘reverse apartheid’ discourse.  Labour laws are similarly viewed as 
legislation that has been ‘forced’ upon a sector of the population unable (rather than 
unwilling) to comply, thereby ‘showing up’ the government as being undemocratic 
and prejudicial to white agrarian interests.  This has resulted in farmers having to ‘thin 
out’ their labour force, increasing unemployment, which in turn increases crime.  The 
respondents articulate a keen sense of the social ecology of their locality wherein 
crime becomes the eventual by-product of the dismantling of white privilege. 
Similarly the new wage system for farm workers is described as exacerbating racial 
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tension, precisely due to retrenchments. However possibly the largest and most 
contentious issue for respondents is that of land reform.  
 
Extract 8 
The Land Affairs [department] are interested in buying up the ground and certain pockets 
of land have gone, uh, for that reason. You know, they are getting their rights […] You 
know, unfortunately we are in the middle of this whole process and at this stage I can’t 
see that, you know, there’s going to be too much positive coming out of it. Because the 
people that have been given, allocated the land are not equipped to produce to make it 
viable. And the money that they’re getting is money lost. 
 
Land reform threatens their assets and is seen as a waste of money in that the black 
peasantry are not considered able to farm commercially.  Furthermore the reform 
process is not being done ‘efficiently’. This position draws strongly on liberal 
discourse concerning the sanctity of individual property.  It is very similar to the kind 
of arguments and exclusionary discursive practices identified by Dixon (1997) in his 
study of the Hout Bay residents’ responses to the emergence of informal settlements 
in close proximity to their homes.  Individuals are accorded the ‘inviolable’ right to 
private property by the state, yet the very same state is threatening the sanctity of this 
property and this right (Dixon, 1997).  The basis of this argument is the notion that the 
land reform process does not set about ensuring universal access to land through 
liberal means (i.e. through the market, or through merit), but by actually suspending 
the right to equality and property of farmers (if their land is expropriated), and is 
therefore anti-liberal.  
 
Extract 9 
The blacks believe it’s their right to take back, but I mean, who paid for these farms? 
We’ve all worked very hard; we’re still working hard just to keep our heads above water. 
So we’ve taken nothing from nobody. We paid for what we’ve got. So I mean, it’s not 
democratic to take another person’s life, it’s not democratic to want to take another 
person’s place.  
 
It is clear in the above extracts that farmers are in fact aware of the kind of ideological 
tensions existing within a liberal discourse of individual rights and freedoms.  Their 
property is constructed as theirs, by inviolable right and by hard work.  It is thus the 
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duty of a democratic and liberal government to recognise and protect this right.  Yet 
what these participants are experiencing is the threatening of these rights by that 
government in the cause of making restitution and ensuring the eventual universal 
access to the selfsame rights for all citizens at some point in the future.  Yet, it is 
precisely due to the uncritical inability to reflect on the circumstances supporting their 
past privilege (King, 2001), together with either an inability, or an unwillingness 
(perhaps understandable given their experience of discrimination) to ‘buy in’ to the 
envisioned ideal “system culture” of liberal democracy, that participants experience 
this tension.  The historical irony of these illocutions is that a viable class of black 
farmers were marginalized and proletarianised by a complex web of legislation and 
social practice in the early twentieth century expansion of racialised agrarian 
capitalism (Beinart, Delius & Trapido, 1986; Bundy, 1979).  
 
In order to understand the nature of this discursive dilemma, respondents defensively 
draw upon the ‘democracy as reverse apartheid’ discourse, as well as prejudiced 
ideology to construct these events as unjust, and undemocratic persecution of white 
farmers. This is further supported by what Van Dijk (1987, p. 91) characterises as 
“one of the most stereotypical moves used in prejudiced talk … which usually 
contains a general denial of (one’s own) negative opinions about ethnic groups, 
followed by a negative opinion.”  This apparent denial and negation of their 
prejudiced attitudes serves (at least in the minds of the interviewees) to justify their 
indignation at their perceived persecution.  Simultaneously, such utterances attempt to 
draw distinctions between statements performing particular ideological and 
positioning functions, and statements that are merely descriptive (Potter, 1996).  In 
this case, respondents are using the disavowal of their prejudiced subject positions to 
attempt to construct their perceptions as ‘objectively true’ descriptions of the way 
things are.     
 
Extract 10 
I’m of the old school, so certainly change has been very difficult to accept […] because you 
know we’ve grown up that way. It’s unfortunate that we did grow up that way. We were 
brainwashed too, to a certain extent. To a large degree, you know, the communities that we 
lived in, the people that we’ve grown up with, um, it’s just been like that. So I don’t feel I’ve 
got myself to blame for that.  I think it’s the society that we grew up in.  And, uh, yes, you 
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know, maybe we, maybe we were being … the whites were being suppressive, and, uh, you 
know.  I’ve never been a hard-liner, I’ve never been a right-winger or any of that type of 
thing, but certainly as things are, sometimes I get very anti- … anti-black. And I can tell you 
that straight because it’s, you know, there are certain things that are just not acceptable, and 
it’s always – unfortunately when there are unacceptable things – it revolves around the blacks.  
 
Extract 11 
 
Look, I have nothing against that guy that’s black, or this guy that’s white, and this guy that’s 
pink, and that guy that’s purple. For me it’s about stability.  
 
Extract 10, above, is a perfect exemplar of the manner in which participants’ 
‘dysconsciousness’ of the machinations underpinning their past positions of 
privilege prevents the ideological reconciliation between the proverbial ‘omelettes 
and eggs’ of individual rights versus the rights of all.  The expression of this 
conflict is made abundantly clear, especially if we consider that the same 
participant spoke of democracy as the ability to act out one’s rights in Extract 2 – 
a particularly clear expression of democracy in terms of liberal values.  Yet, there 
is more to this than simply an unwillingness to accept the changes in the status 
quo that are the end result of applying liberal democracy universally.   
 
There is also an attempt to construct a subject position of righteously indignant 
victim through the active disavowal of both the participant’s own prejudice and 
culpability for the past political dispensation as in Extract 11, where this 
disavowal of prejudice includes an attempt to divert attention from issues of race 
to focus more on the substantive living conditions experienced by farmers.  In 
Extract 10, the participant positions himself as a more or less passive product of 
the social and political circumstances in which he grew up, and which he, as a 
mere individual agent, had (and indeed still has) no power to alter.  This open 
denial of responsibility dis-identification with the system of Apartheid is, 
however, a superficial rhetorical strategy, shown by the participant’s transfer of 
responsibility from the designation of in-group membership (“we were being 
suppressive”) to a more neutral and distanced collectivity (“the whites were being 
suppressive”).   
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What this amounts to is a defensive racism – a reactionary backlash perpetuating 
prejudiced ways of talk that goes hand in hand with the constructed subject 
position of victim.  That this reaction takes the form of prejudiced ways of 
constructing the racial ‘Other’ is not too surprising, seeing as, at least in this sector 
of the population, racial modes of thinking have, at least anecdotally, been an 
accepted discursive tradition.  These attitudes are perhaps reinforced by (not 
necessarily accurate) perceptions of governmental reform strategies as 
“entrenching racial and class divides and thus giving credence to those who think 
in racial terms” (Desai, 2000, pp. 3-4).     
 
3.1.4) The old days were better 
Together with the claimed mantel of victim, there is a wistful longing for the old days 
in which things were ‘better’: a colonial farming lifestyle, with a subservient and 
cheap workforce, favourable state interventions and the benevolent, patriarchal 
farmer. 
 
Extract 12 
Ag, I mean in the olden days – when I was younger – when your people used to come to 
you, you used to help them, you used to … and you could chat to one another and … but 
now you can’t. They’re sort of so demanding […] and of course I believe in the old days, 
the people, the people on the farms – even if they didn’t get much pay – they had a much 
better life.  
 
This discursive position is argued to be the corollary to Fanon’s idea of the oppressed 
consciousness of the colonised.  It is the oppressive consciousness of the coloniser.  In 
the same way as the consciousness of the colonised is constructed as inferior and 
subservient (Ahluwalia, 2001), the consciousness of the oppressor must be shaped by 
the colonial discourse to justify and maintain white privilege and liberty whilst 
denying black history, rights and humanity. Ahluwalia (2001, pp. 40-41) citing Fanon, 
argues, “A necessary part of colonialism is that the colonisers problematise the culture 
and the very being of the colonised, and the latter come to accept the ‘supremacy of 
the white man’s values.’” Just as the colonised needs to be liberated from this pattern 
of constructing the ‘Self’ and the racial ‘Other’, so does the coloniser. 
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However, this liberation of the consciousness of the past oppressor – embodied in this 
case by the white farmer – does not seem to have happened, thereby giving credence 
to King’s (2001) ideas concerning dysconscious racism. For, as Dixon (1997) 
suggests, recourse to a liberal discourse about rights and freedoms does not preclude 
the possibility of collusion with a discourse of racial segregation and superiority.  This 
‘colonial discourse’ and nostalgic construction of the past can be clearly discerned in 
the following extracts: 
 
Extract 13 
Earlier times, the worker got less as salary, but he got more in the form of food, clothes, 
shoes, housing, all those things.  All those things.  If one of my people got sick, I took my 
vehicle and drove him in […] Through the years you build up a relationship with them.  
This servant that works here […] she must have come to work here in ’86.  She’s seen my 
sons grow up.  Now, I mean, if there was a bad relationship between us, she wouldn’t 
have stayed. 
 
Extract 14 
I had families here that had a lot of other people living with them, and which had young 
children.  They would come on a Saturday and sweep the yard, at no ‘moerse’ charge.  
The children got sweets and cooldrink.  And I didn’t have to call them to come and do it 
– they did it because they wanted to, if they could, you know, get cooldrink, or get 
sweets.  Those type of things.  Now I’m not allowed to use them. 
 
A key feature of these attempts to reconstruct an idyllic representation of ‘the way 
things used to be’ is that they plainly ignore the fact that the past political 
dispensation allowed such circumstances to develop precisely because of the gross 
exploitation and oppression of rural, black South African labour power – where even 
underage labour was used for the purposes of constructing the physical features of this 
idealised façade.  There is even the attempt to construct the rural black South African 
labourer as a willing participant in the maintenance of this ‘colonial-esque’ system of 
oppression.  Now, however, there is the governmentally enforced compulsion to alter 
these circumstances and to sacrifice their freedom to enjoy the standard of living that 
these farmers construct as a right earned through their own hard labour.   
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What is more, such attempts at reconstructing a better past go further than expressing 
a nostalgic reminiscence.  These accounts also attempt to make the assertion that there 
has indeed been some sort of substantial (not to mention negative) change in both the 
relationship between farmers and their labourers, as well as in the living conditions in 
the rural areas.  The attempt is made to argue that circumstances for farmers have 
been substantially reduced and irrevocably altered for the worse by the process of 
democratisation.  This further illustrates (for the farmers themselves, as well as for 
outside observers) the manner in which a supposedly liberal democratic system has 
failed to protect the rights and freedoms of a particular sector of society.     
  
3.1.5) Things are worse for the people, too 
An extension of the above discourse constructing an idyllic colonial past, is the 
further argument, amongst those farmers who view democracy negatively, that ‘the 
people’ themselves are also worse off. Respondents argue that many of the 
‘democratic’ reforms have impacted negatively on the rural poor, who make up their 
workforce. The same instances used to argue that they, as farmers, are worse off, are 
again drawn upon as anecdotal evidence here. Labour laws supposedly make it 
impossible to provide employment for as many people as used to be possible in the 
past.  The farm wages legislation is blamed as the cause for farmers having to retrench 
workers, thereby increasing rural unemployment, and crime.  
 
Extract 15 
I get the impression they want to use legislation to drive a wedge between the farmer and his 
workers […] the impression I get is that the people aren’t happy with these salaries. And you 
also can’t blame the farmer if he has thirty labourers – like this farm of ours – where you get 
something in, in the summer, but in he winter have to plough it in to the livestock to get them 
through. Can you work out what it costs that farmer to pay those workers? […] and who’s 
going to suffer? Not just the people – the farmer too. The reason being, if I’m hungry I’m 
going to steal 
 
The manner of implementation of land reform – over and above a supposed Black 
inability to farm productively – is also said to make it extremely difficult for Black 
farmers to produce anything other than subsistence needs, to the detriment of both the 
people and the productive capacity of the land.  
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Extract 16 
You can’t expect 100kg of mutton from a 60kg sheep. Uh, if the ground is becoming 
smaller … less ground cannot produce more food.  For me, it’s all about a stable country.  
If it … Man, show me a country that’s hungry and stable 
 
While critical questions can be posed of the plight of the rural poor in the new 
political dispensation, the legitimacy of this questioning itself needs to be examined.  
Although possibly motivated by varying degrees of benign concern for the rural 
subaltern, these arguments are used to perform certain functions.  It can be asked 
whether the farmers are truly speaking for the marginalized rural poor?  Or is this 
merely discursive strategy for articulating and masking their critiques of post-
Apartheid South Africa?  If the former, these critiques have a degree of legitimacy in 
that they call into question policies implemented by the ANC government that have 
impacted (and not always positively) on the living conditions of people in rural South 
Africa.  If the latter, then the argument that the people are worse off is put to the 
ideological use of ‘proving’ that the indigenous populace cannot govern, as well as to 
‘show’ the government up as inefficient, uncaring and unresponsive.  To do this, use 
is made of examples of what are perceived to be poor (and unfair) democratic 
government by blacks.  
 
Extract 17 
If I could ask the government … I just can’t understand how they would want to encourage 
unemployment.  
 
Extract 18 
If it’s not going to go Zimbabwe’s way, then it’ll always be a democracy. But I mean, hey, 
Zimbabwe – if we’re going to be sympathetic towards Zimbabwe, then we’re not democratic. 
So then I’m afraid … then we’re just totally autocratic. And we don’t want to be that way, 
certainly.  
 
Extract 19 
We are having to give up certain things that, I mean, we never used to have to give up and, 
uh, the blacks that have bought farms, that are also employing labour, are not subjected to 
the same laws. And to me that’s not democracy. And they’re not going to force those black 
guys to comply, I can guarantee you right now they won’t […] but they will force us […] 
certainly they’re going to give us a hard time.  
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Whilst critique of a government that is not delivering is legitimate within a 
democratic society – these kinds of arguments could be used as ‘evidence’ for 
specifically black governmental incompetence.  It is interesting to note that this 
construction of farmers and their workforce as suffering at the hands of ill-conceived 
governmental policies is then contrasted with the idealised apartheid era in a kind of 
colonial discourse characterised by a ‘wistful longing’ for a better past. 
 
Extract 20 
We are actually worse off now than what we were […] I think it’s like that for everybody.  
 
3.2) Democracy: ‘It should have happened a hundred years ago’  
In contrast to the reactionary pessimism of the first group of respondents, the majority 
of the younger participants (along with a few older ones) can be characterised as 
articulating what might appear to be an interpretative repertoire of diametrically 
opposed, forward-thinking optimism.  For these farmers, the general outlook is much 
more positive, although as will be suggested, some of their critiques are based in 
similar discourse and ideology.  
 
3.2.1) Democracy is about rights and freedom. 
Once again, definitions of democracy revolve around individual rights and freedoms, 
and as previously stated, these respondents construct the notion of democracy as an 
end product of change rather than a means by which it can be achieved (O’Malley, 
1999).  Therefore, democracy is seen to work in an idealistic sense.   
 
Extract 21 
Anyone is free to voice their own opinions, to live their life the way that they wish to, to 
express themselves the way they wish to, to practice their religion the way they wish to, 
all within a safe, structured country with a reasonably good government.  
 
Extract 22 
Democracy is freedom to live a person’s life within the laws of the country. You know, 
government for the people by the people. No oppression. In whichever country you live 
in, which is a democracy, there is no oppression of one group by another. It means 
equality […] we’re all equal; everyone living in a democracy is equal in terms of dignity. 
It’s about human dignity. 
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Extract 23 
But democracy is not just about rights. It’s a word that is supposed to mean freedom, but 
that freedom doesn’t really exist. So it’s not just rights, it’s more of an attitude, like 
respect. Respect for people equally – skin colour doesn’t matter. 
 
The discursive occurrence that is taking place here is, similar to the first repertoire, 
also an attempt by participants to articulate their experience of the ideological tension 
between the implementation of democracy and liberal values and ideology.  However, 
this repertoire differs form the first in that participants here seem able to reconcile this 
tension between the “system culture” and the “policy culture” through the use of a 
more ‘permissive’ mode of speaking that makes allowance for this conflict of interest.  
Interestingly, participants articulating this second repertoire do not make use of 
attempts to disavow their past positions of privilege, but instead seem to recognise it 
as a salient factor in the constitution of the ideological conflict that they are 
experiencing.   
 
This recognition, in turn, allows for a number of things.  Firstly, participants are able 
to reconcile the disparity between the rights of the individual versus the rights of all, 
thereby freeing them up to articulate a more optimistic view of democracy.  Secondly, 
participants, in reconciling this tension to some degree, are enabled to develop a more 
sophisticated, and less substantively focused definition of democracy (and this is 
visible in their talk of attitudes, equality and dignity, as opposed to a more restricted 
focus on rights and freedoms).   
 
As can be seen from the above extracts, there is a general agreement with the 
‘principles’ of democracy as well as the implicit recognition that Apartheid was 
morally wrong. With these responses drawing heavily on the idea of rights, equality 
and freedom, it is easy to see that their illocutions make use of a discourse of 
liberalism as described by Dixon (1997). What is more – and this is what sets this 
group of responses apart from the former one (see extract 19) – this liberal discourse 
recognises the need for political and social change to have occurred, and does not 
make use of the notion of individual rights to argue for the protection of white 
privilege.  At the same time there is a similar sort of denial of the privileged positions 
that participants occupied in the past, yet in this instance it is not used to strategically 
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enable participants to construct their pessimism towards democracy as a ‘legitimate’ 
defensive reaction to a threat.  Instead, this distancing of the subject position form 
complicity with the ‘Apartheid regime’ is drawn upon to rhetorically support the 
transition towards democracy. 
 
Extract 24 
Well I mean a lot of changes have come from the old regime to the new regime. But, uh, 
it should have happened a hundred years ago, that’s what […] if it happened a hundred 
years ago, we’d be ten times better off now. Because we’re at the difficult stage at the 
moment and I say the word ‘apartheid’ should have never been there. 
 
Extract 25 
I’ve always been free and had privileges. The changes in the country have meant having 
to recognise that all people have the right to these privileges and to equality. Most people 
now have got access to what I’ve had all along and have taken for granted. For many, 
democracy has come too late. But it has meant that I’ve had to take notice of other people 
as equals. It also means that I have had to share the privileges I’ve had. 
 
Extract 26 
Yes, but you see, now, we were spoiled in the past. Because when you walked in as a 
white, you just expected to get a job, and you got the job. Now things have changed, and 
we’ve got to adjust to that, that’s all. And make the best of it. If you can’t get this job, go 
look for something else, and that’s the way it is.  
 
Simultaneously, there is amongst these participants, the admission of some 
discrepancy in the manner in which democracy is being implemented.  The tension 
between liberal ideology and substantive democracy is not completely resolved, and 
participants are thus required to construct explanations for their experience of this 
conflict in such a way as to create a subject positioning that they believe is 
commensurate with both their already expressed support for the implementation of 
democracy, as well as the liberal values that they have espoused.  In order to do this, 
participants draw on a discursive strategy that allows them to agree with democracy in 
principle, yet criticise the manner of substantive implementation.  
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3.2.2) Dysfunctional democracy. 
Criticisms of democracy revolve around the collapse of infrastructure, safety and 
security, and a sort of generalised anxiety concerning the political future of the 
country.  No mention is made in these responses about the worsening plight of 
farmers or a deliberate reversal of apartheid discrimination.  Instead, these criticisms 
of the government and of the processes of change seem to be premised upon the idea 
of farmers being able to maintain the standard of life that they have become 
accustomed to – again drawing upon liberal ideals.  As long as this standard of living 
is not substantively threatened, respondents do not express much disquiet regarding 
democracy and change.  This is coupled with a general sense of optimism – such that 
the current ‘bad’ situations are not viewed as an unending downward spiral, but 
merely as part of an ongoing transitional period, more akin to O’Malley’s (1999) 
conception of democracy as a ‘process’.  
 
Extract 27 
Well I suppose things must go down before going up. 
 
Extract 28 
It’s going to take time. Financially, the infrastructure has fallen to pieces, but I think in time 
it will build up again, because after the Boer war it was the same. There was no 
infrastructure, and it was built up again. So I see a future in the country. Uh, we’re not used 
to this, as being white, we’re not used to it … it’s difficult for us to accept it. 
 
Extract 29  
In this country? Do you think democracy has been working? 
Yes, not one hundred percent. I don’t think democracy works one hundred percent anywhere  
Why not? 
Well not everyone follows all the rules and, um, I don’t think many people even know what 
are and … But I think it has to a certain extent worked more successfully here than in most 
places that change from different regimes to democracy. It’s been one of the more successful 
changeovers – has been here. 
 
Extract 30 
I think it’s definitely working. That’s why I say it should have happened a hundred years ago, 
not now. But it should have happened. Definitely, it had to come […] I mean it’s going to 
improve year by year – it’s going to improve. 
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This particular discursive positioning that allows participants to ideologically support 
democracy, yet criticise the manner of its implementation, differs substantially from 
the negative and pessimistic criticisms of democracy articulated by participants using 
the first repertoire.  Instead of constructing this critique from a defensive positioning, 
participants here are attempting to develop a strategy to understand and explain the 
process of change that incorporates the tension felt to exist between individual rights 
and the rights accorded to all, between the “system culture” and the “policy culture”.  
This, in turn, means that the optimism that participants express is ameliorated to some 
degree, allowing participants to reconcile the contradiction between their already 
expressed support for the democratic ideal, and the ‘negative’ impact that the process 
of democratisation has had on the substantive conditions that comprise their 
accustomed standard of living.   
 
3.2.3) ‘They’ just need to adjust 
However, in trying to account for the discrepancies between the ideal of democracy, 
as constituted by a ‘liberal discourse’, and the realities of poor governance and service 
delivery in the province, racial discourse is drawn upon to explain the transition, and 
the problems currently being experienced. However, this discourse differs from the 
‘apartheid’ and ‘colonial’ discourses discussed above in that it does not actively 
advocate a return to a ‘better’ past where whites were in control.  Instead, it operates 
on a more subtle level by implicitly reaffirming white superiority in terms of intellect 
and governmental aptitude.  
 
This implicit prejudice in the discourse indicates the manner in which an ideology of 
white superiority and black inferiority has adapted to the changes that have occurred 
in post-apartheid South African society, and still informs white explanations and 
constructions of the black ‘Other’.  It allows participants to preserve the old manner 
of subject positioning in terms of racial superiority, by according them the 
opportunity to construct their critiques of democracy from a position that includes 
patronising attitudes and understandings of the new Black government.   An example 
of this is reflected in the idea that blacks are unable to cope with being in power and 
are therefore susceptible to corruption, or that they are still learning how to govern 
and need whites to help them.  Such fundamentally ideological arguments serve to 
maintain the superiority of Whites.  
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Extract 31  
Yes it works, the ideal of democracy.  It has to work. It must work.  But it doesn’t if people 
seek their own gain.  Maybe democracy can’t work in practice if people become corrupt and 
greedy.  It doesn’t work when people only use it to look after themselves […] I don’t think 
democracy is working in South Africa.  The new regime oppresses others as well.  I don’t 
really know why …perhaps it’s all the change that has taken place; all the sudden ‘muchness’ 
– perhaps they can’t handle it. 
 
Extract 32 
Sometimes I think they don’t really know how to handle the situation, quite at the moment. 
They must still adjust to it.  And that’s the excuse that you give them.  They’ve got a long way 
to go […] and if more whites just want to help them to adjust it would go better.  But some are 
still against democracy, so they’re not willing to help and, you know, tell them “look, we 
think if you do this” … or “we think if you do that” … They want to tell them “look, you must 
do that” still, and then they must do that.  And you know they were so far behind in the past, 
now they’re standing up to it, I think.  And then they just think, “Well, we’re going to do it 
our way”. 
 
Whilst such expressions of a patronisingly superior positioning of whites in relation to 
blacks in terms of governmental competence (not to mention moral rectitude, 
incorruptibility, and even intelligence) seem to be more subtle expressions of 
prejudice than the criticisms posed by the participants that articulated the first 
repertoire, both types of expressions of prejudice stem from attempts to address the 
ideological conflict experienced by participants in terms of the tension between the 
ascription to liberal ideology and the simultaneous adoption of democratic ideals.  
Thus, instead of the above extracts providing examples of what Whillock & Slayden 
(1995) conceive of as expressions of subtle racism, it is argued that all the expressions 
of racism and prejudice articulated by the participants in this research – both 
optimistic and pessimistic – illustrate two distinct rhetorical strategies for resolving 
what Wetherell & Potter (1992) have characterised as an ideological conflict.   
 
3.2.4) The future looks bright. 
Significantly, participants in this second group are very sanguine about the future of 
the next generation, feeling that children growing up in the democratic society will be 
more tolerant and accepting of each other.  This is contrasted with respondents’ own 
upbringing and relative difficulty in dealing with change.  It is interesting to note that 
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this notion might even be vindicated simply by looking at the age characteristics of 
the two different sets of respondents – the older respondents generally being more 
negative about democracy and finding it harder to cope, ideologically, with change 
than the younger ones.  
 
Extract 33 
I’m quite excited for my children’s future, for their school career, because it will be 
radically different from my own, for various reasons. And I can already see the change in 
my own children from the way I grew up, or was brought up. 
 
Extract 34 
For us, I mean, it’s difficult to cope with what’s going on. But for the little ones, for the 
kids – they’re growing up with it now, so for them it’s going to be easier. 
 
This optimism reflects the key difference between the two interpretative repertoires 
identified by the analysis, and shows how the ability of this second group of 
participants to reconcile the ideological conflict between the values entailed in the 
political ideal of democracy and those of liberal ideology can result in a subject 
positioning vastly different to that created by the first group of participants.  Instead 
of creating a position in which the participants defensively construct themselves as 
‘victims’ of a hypocritical and uncaring government that is systematically subjecting 
them to unfair discrimination (as is achieved in the first repertoire), here, subjects are 
able to construct a more positive notion of their own socio-political status, and 
therefore are able to remain optimistic about the future development of the country.  
 
This second position, is however (as has been elucidated above) not one of 
unmediated optimism.  Participants’ accounts still reflect that their experience of 
democratic change is one of an observable decline in their standard of living and the 
material conditions of life in the rural areas.  However, these circumstances are put to 
the rhetorical use of positioning subjects as ‘martyrs’, who realise that there is a need 
for a levelling of the playing fields, as it were.  Thus, it is possible for these 
participants to remain positive concerning the future of the country, as they can 
construe their negative experiences of democratic change as a part of the process of 
achieving the necessary political (and ideological) ideal of liberal democracy.   
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Chapter 4: Concluding Comments 
4.1) Review of the findings 
To conclude, let us conduct a brief review of the findings of the research. Responses 
to the interview questions were divided into two broad interpretative repertoires, each 
making distinctive use of different discursive strategies to construct the subjects in a 
particular way and each subtly promoting a particular ideological stance towards 
democracy.  
 
The first of these two repertoires made use of a negative or pessimistic group of 
discursive practices. Responses falling under this category tend to adopt a substantive 
and liberal discourse when defining the concept of democracy, seeing it primarily as 
an issue of sovereign individual rights and privileges, and arguing for the maintenance 
of these rights.  Yet participants are simultaneously unable to manage the tensions that 
they experience existing between these two ideals – tensions between the protection 
of individual liberties and rights, and the universal democratic rights of all.   
 
This inability to reconcile the contradictions between notions of democracy and 
liberal discourse forms the basis for participants defensively constructing a negative 
and racist account of democracy in South Africa.  The idea of individual rights and 
freedoms is used to highlight the ‘skewed’ manner in which respondents feel 
democracy has been implemented, providing them with a justification for feeling 
aggrieved at the erosion of their former political and, to a lesser extent, economic 
status.  As such it is used to construct an account of democracy as ‘reverse apartheid’ 
in which the subjects (i.e. white farmers) are positioned as the ‘victims’.   
 
Stereotypical strategies of prejudicial talk (Van Dijk, 1987) are utilised in an attempt 
to disavow the subjects’ own racism and to construct their ‘plight’ as unjust and 
unwarranted, and arguments criticising the apparent hypocrisy of the democratic 
government (always framed in strategies of talk that draw heavily on notions of the 
‘other’) are used rhetorically to assert the validity of their criticisms.  
 
Together with this liberal notion of democracy, and the idea that South African 
democracy is ‘reverse apartheid’, respondents in this category draw upon an 
‘apartheid’ discourse of racial and cultural distinctiveness and separateness to 
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construct a notion of how they would like democracy to function. Such an idyllic 
notion of separateness and liberal democratic rights, in collaboration with an 
attempted disavowal of their own racism contributes toward a discourse of 
‘dysconscious racism’ (King, 2001).  This discursive strategy characterises what this 
paper posits as a corollary of Fanon’s ‘consciousness of the colonised’ – the 
consciousness of the coloniser: a discursive and ideological ‘relic’ of the old structure 
of South African society that is still being circulated. This discursive practice is 
played out in talk that expresses a wistful longing for a genteel colonial past in the 
rural areas.  
 
Standing in contrast to this is the second repertoire, which encapsulates the positive or 
optimistic group of discursive practices.  Responses in this category tend to adopt a 
more flexible version of the discourses of democracy and liberalism, seeing 
democracy as both an end product of individual rights and privileges, as well as a 
‘process’ of achieving those ends.  In this way, liberal discourse is not used to argue 
for the maintenance of the privileged position of a particular group.  Instead, there is 
the ability of the participants in this second repertoire to reconcile the different 
tensions inherent in the discourses of democracy and liberalism that they draw upon 
in the construction of their accounts, displayed by participants’ recognition of the 
rights of all to the rights and privileges that they would like to see maintained.  
 
Criticisms of the implementation of democracy are, in contrast to the first repertoire, 
not as rigidly framed in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’, and do not make the attempt to 
conjure up images of past colonial or apartheid ‘glory’.  Instead, participants draw 
upon rhetorical positioning strategies that make use of a more subtle racist discourse 
based on the idea of competence and ability.  Blacks are not seen as able to govern 
properly and competently without the aid of whites, and are constructed as easily 
corruptible by power.  The way in which it is articulated, and the manner in which it 
positions its white speakers is far more nuanced than the openly prejudiced discourses 
of the former category.  In this way, its speakers are able to ideologically maintain 
their superiority without blatantly (or even consciously) arguing for a return to 
political and economic privilege.  
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This, in turn, enables respondents within this second group of discourses to adopt a 
more optimistic and forward-looking discourse about democracy and change in South 
Africa, and the future political and economic development of the country, in which 
respondents construct themselves as individuals committed to sharing the country and 
political power according to the ideals of democracy. 
 
4.2) Suggestions for further research 
Naturally, this study cannot claim to have provided an exhaustive or comprehensive 
account of South African farmers’ perceptions of and attitudes towards democracy, as 
articulated through various discursive strategies.  It is therefore imperative that this 
research is regarded as an exploratory study only, and that it is recognised that the 
need for far more extensive and in-depth research in this subject area remains if we 
are to assess the widespread extent and depth to which political change in this country 
has successfully translated into change in the ideological belief structures of South 
Africans.  This study has barely scratched the surface, but it will hopefully provide a 
useful staring point for other studies.   
 
It is therefore suggested that further research of this nature be carried out within a 
larger and more varied sample population to assess whether the findings of this 
analysis may be borne out or transferred to other sectors of the South African 
population.  Likewise, it may indeed be worthwhile to carry out similar studies with 
different sample populations, representative of other sectors of our society and to 
conduct a comparative analysis of the findings in order to more accurately gauge the 
extent of ideological change that has taken place in South Africa since 1994, as it is 
articulated through the manners in which individuals speak of democracy and their 
positions within the broader socio-political milieu.    
 
4.3) Concerns regarding the validity of the research 
Finally, it is perhaps important at this stage to address questions concerning the 
validity of this research.  Concerns raised in an earlier section of this thesis 
concerning the methodology employed by the research would be useful departure 
points for a discussion at this stage.   Yet there are many different ways in which to 
define and assess the notion of validity as it relates to discourse analytic research, and 
these may include aspects of the analysis such as rigour, detail, coherence of the 
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analysis, a focus on inconsistencies within the texts, quality of the interpretation, as 
well as others such as relevance, usefulness and application of the research (Taylor, 
2001).  It would be a daunting and exhausting task to attempt to address each of these 
different criteria for evaluation in turn.  
 
In Chapter 2, it was mentioned that McKenna (2004) has identified four key aspects 
to the validation of discourse analytical research – aspects that address the extent to 
which the analysis remains contextually linked, as well the representivity of the 
textual material upon which the analysis is based.  These four aspects will now be 
addressed in turn. 
 
The first consideration is that of convergence (the degree of coherence between the 
various categories of discourse identified by the analysis) (McKenna, 2004).  Whilst it 
is natural that there will always be a degree of contradiction and dynamism in 
individual’s accounts of the social world, it is felt that the analyses of the interview 
texts offered by this thesis has a relatively high degree of convergence.  Despite the 
recognition that this research cannot be characterised as conclusive or comprehensive, 
it is argued that the categories of discourse identified by the analysis relate to each 
other well enough to create an explanatory framework that is at one time both 
coherent and yet flexible enough to incorporate the fact that this research is very much 
exploratory and therefore must needs be subject to revision in the future. 
 
Secondly, attention must be paid to the notion of agreement (the ability of the analysis 
to convince native speakers of the discourse of its validity) (McKenna, 2004). This 
idea is akin to Kvale’s (1996) notion of communicative validity within the 
communities of validation, whereby qualitative research can be validated by the act of 
communicating it to different potential audiences.  This research can therefore be 
validated through communication of the analysis to either the interviewees, the 
general public, or to the theoretical community (Kvale, 1996).  As this thesis is an 
academic endeavour, the most appropriate audience for validation would be the 
theoretical community and validity would be attested by assessing “whether the 
theory is valid for the area studied, and whether the specific interpretations follow 
logically from the theory” (Kvale, 1996, p. 217).   This sort of validation is sought, as 
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opposed to the agreement of either the participants or the general public as to the 
logical sense and coherence of the analysis.  
 
Thirdly, questions of validation must address coverage (the degree to which the 
conclusions of the analysis can be transferred to related sets of data) (McKenna, 
2004).  At this stage it is not possible to assess the validity of the above analysis in 
terms of the degree to which the findings of the analysis can be transferred to other, 
similar contexts.  As has been mentioned previously, this thesis reflects an exploratory 
discourse analytical study.  Further research in both similar and varied contexts will 
be required in order to assess if the findings of this thesis are indeed transferable.  
 
Finally, validity of discourse analytical research must be concerned with linguistic 
detail (the extent to which the analysis focuses on the linguistic structures of the text) 
(McKenna, 2004).  As the discourse analysis conducted for this thesis was not 
specifically focused on the linguistic characteristics of talk concerning democracy, it 
is clear that there was not too much focus on the linguistic detail of the accounts 
produced by the participants.  Yet, given that the analysis was focused more on the 
rhetorical strategies used by participants to construct their subject positions with 
regard to the processes of democratic change that have occurred in South Africa, as 
well as on the ideological underpinnings of these positioning strategies, a close 
attention to the linguistic details of interview texts was not deemed vital.  To this end, 
it is argued that the above thesis has sufficiently satisfied the necessary criteria for an 
assessment of its validity.  
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